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GRICE'S "IMPLICATURE" AND LITERARY INTERPRETATION: BACKGROUND AND PREFACE 
These remarks are preliminary to the forum, "Grice's 'Implicature' and 
Literary Interpretation," which will be held at the Twentieth Annual 
Meeting of the Midwest Modern Language Association, Minneapolis, Minne-
sota, 2-4 November 1978, in cooperation with the Minnesota Center for 
Advanced Studies in Language, Style, and Literary Theory. Papers will be 
given by: Marilyn Cooper, Department of English, University of Minnesota; 
Mary Pratt, Department of Spanish and Portuguese, Stanford University; and 
Ellen Schauber, Department of Linguistics, Northwestern University, and 
Ellen Spolsky, Department of English, University of New Mexico. The com-
mentator will be Monroe Beardsley, Department of Philosophy, Temple Uni-
versity. 
H.P. Grice (b. 1913), formerly a Fellow of St. John's College, Oxford, now 
teaches philosophy of language at the University of California, Berkeley. 
Two aspects of Grice's work are particularly relevant to literary inter-
pretation: his theory of nonnatural meaning, and his theory of conversa-
tional implicature. 
MEANING. In a series of influential and controversial papers (Grice 
1957, 1968, 1969), Grice has argued that the meaning of a word (or non-
natural sign) in general is a derivative function of what speakers mean 
by that word in individual instances of uttering it. That is, the uni-
versal "type" meaning, or set of such meanings, for a given word is an 
abstraction from the "token" meanings that speakers mean for the word in 
specific instances of use. 
Among other things, this account opposes the formalist orthodoxy in 
semantic theory, according to which the universal conventional meaning 
(or set of meanings) of a word predetermines what that word might mean 
in any given instance of use. The conventional theory discourages inquiry 
into what a particular speaker might mean by a word in a particular utter-
ance; to understand the utterance it is enough to know what the word 
"means" tout court. But Grice holds that what a word "means" derives 
from what speakers mean by uttering it; and he further holds that "what a 
particular speaker or writer means by a sign on a particular occasion • . 
may well diverge from the standard meaning of the sign" {Grice 1957: 381). 
Grice's analysis of verbal meaning in terms of the speaker's intentions 
has become increasingly elaborate, as he and others have revised it 
(Strawson 1964~ Schiffer 1972). This elaboration has become one·ground 
of objection (Black 1973, MacKay 1972). Ziff (1967) has published an 
influential critique of the theory, which Patton and Stampe (1969) sub-
ject to a detailed rebuttal. Searle (1969: 42-50} incorporates Grice's 
analysis into his own speech-act model, but only after radical revision 
to suppress the unconventional aspect. 
Grice's arguments on behalf of the speaker's intentions have an obvious 
Hancher 2. 
bearing on some perennial questions in literary theory; see R. Brown 
(1974), Hancher (1972), Hirsch (1975). 
I.MPLICATURE. A few years after publishing his original paper on mean-
ing, Grice sketched out a theory of pragmatic implication, distinct from 
semantic implication, as a tool for resolving certain linguistic problems 
in the theory of perception (Grice 1961). Consider an utterance such as: 
(1) That box looks red to me. 
Grice denied that it is simply by virtue of the semantics of the phrase 
"looks to me" that uttering (1) implies the acknowledgement of some 
doubt or denial of the box being red. Rather, such an implication arises 
from "a general feature or principle of the use of language." Grice 
roughly formulated that principle as, "One should not make a weaker state-
ment rather than a stronger one unless there is a good reason for_§.£ doing." 
It is the hearer's tacit knowledge of such a principle governing the 
speaker's use of language, rather than of any peculiar semantic features 
(or, for that matter, pragmatic features) of the phrase "looks to me," 
that enables him to infer, on hearing the speaker say (1), that the 
speaker means to acknowledge by implication that some doubt has been 
cast on the box's being red. 
Similarly for an utterance such as: 
(2) Rudy is either in Minneapolis or in St. Paul. 
It is the hearer's tacit knowledge of the general pragmatic principle 
discouraging "weak" statements, rather than of any special semantic or 
pragmatic features of the word "or," that enables him to infer, on hear-
ing the speaker say (2), that the speaker means to imply that he does 
not know in which of the two cities Rudy is. For, if the speaker had 
known which city, he "ought" to have said which, according to the pro-
posed quasi-ethical principle of language use. By not saying which city, 
the speaker implies (whether truly or falsely) that he does not know which. 
Such general pragmatic implication is "cancellable": that is, the speaker 
can go on to say something that cancels the apparent implication. You 
can't do that with semantic implication. For example, to say that someone 
has "stopped" doing something is to imply, through the semantics of the 
verb, that he once did it; and that implication is not cancellable. You 
can't say: 
(3) *John has stopped smoking, though he never did smoke. 
But the general pragmatic implication of (2) is cancellable. You can say, 
for example: 
The 
(4) Rudy is either in Minneapolis 
but I won't tell you. 
uncertainty implied by (2) is cancelled 
or St. Paul; I know which, 
in (4) without anomaly. 
Grice filled out this sketch of general pragmatic implication in "Logic 
and Conversation," the series of seven William James Lectures that he 
delivered at Harvard University in 1967-68. These lectures, which cir-
culated widely in typescript (Grice 1967), have strongly influenced 
recent work in linguistics and the philosophy of language; representative 
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essays can be found in Cole and Morgan (1975), Rogers, Wall, and Murphy 
(1977), Cole (1978), and the annual volumes published by the Chicago 
Linguistics Society. Gazdar, Pullum, and Klein (1977: El0-12) list addi-
tional items. Gradually portions of the lectures themselves are appear-
ing in print. Grice (1969) includes substantial portions of the fifth and 
sixth lectures. Grice (1975a) and Grice (1975b) each present the pivotal 
second lecture; Grice (1978} is based on the third. After revision the 
whole series is supposed to be published by Harvard University Press. 
In the second lecture, Grice (1975a, 1975b} proposes that participants in 
conversation understand the following general "Cooperative Principle" (ab-
breviated CP) to be in force: "Make your conversational contribution such 
as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, Qy: the accepted purpose 
or direction of the talk exchange in which you~ engaged." This super-
ordinate principle comprises the following subordinate rules or "maxims": 
I. Maxims of Quantity: 1. Make your contribution as informative 
as is required (for the current purposes of the exchange}. 
[Note: this is the strongest-statement-possible principle first 
proposed in Grice (1961), and cited above.] 2. Do not make 
your contribution more informative than is required. 
II. Maxims of Quality: Supermaxim: Try to make your contribution 
one that is true. 1. Do not say what you believe to be false. 
2. Do_not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
III. Maxim of Relation: Be relevant. 
IV. Maxims of Manner: Supermaxim: Be perspicuous. 1. Avoid 
obscurity of expression. 2. Avoid ambiguity. 3. Be brief 
(avoid unnecessary prolixity). 4. Be orderly. 
Because conversation is a cooperative and social enterprise, children are 
instilled with these imperatives as part of the process of socialization 
and language acquistion. Grice would argue further that observing the CP 
and maxims is "reasonable (rational)" behavior, because it tends to bene-
fit the speaker's interest. In any case, the ability to realize these 
imperatives is an important part of a speaker's communicative competence 
(Bates 1976). The result is that a violation of any of these maxims will 
be linguistically aberrant, or "marked," and literally "remarkable." (Once 
the violation is detected, that is; some violations are surreptitious.) 
Faced with a speaker's violation of a maxim, a competent hearer will draw 
one of several possible conclusions, depending on the particular case: 
A. The speaker is openly "opting out" from the operation of the maxim and 
the CP. A famous case is Gordon Liddy's persistent violation of the first 
maxim of Quantity, and repudiation of the CP along with it. 
B. The speaker is deliberately and secretly subverting the maxim and the 
CP, for some usually selfish end. Lying (covertly violating the first 
maxim of Quality) is one example of this. 
C. The speaker means to observe the CP, but fails to fulfill a particular 
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maxim through ineptitude. For example, he may ineptly use words too 
technical for the audience and occasion, inadvertently violating the 
first maxim of Manner. (Grice alludes to this general kind of violation 
only in passing.) 
D. The speaker presumably means to observe the CP, and yet he obviously 
is violating a maxim; if he is not inept, he must mean something addi-
tional to what he is merely saying. For example, when asked what she 
thinks of a new restaurant, a woman who replied, "They have handsome 
carpets," would appear to be flouting the first maxim of Quantity. If 
there is no reason in her case (unlike Gordon Liddy's) to doubt that she 
means to be observing the CP and is capable of doing so, then her remark 
must mean something other than what it literally asserts--such as, for 
example, that the food there is at best mediocre. 
E. The speaker presumably means to observe the CP, and yet he obviously 
fails to fulfill a maxim. Perhaps he could not fulfill both it and 
another maxim as well; that is, perhaps there is a "clash" of maxims in 
these particular circumstances. Thus the speaker of (2) fails to fulfil 
the first maxim of Quantity, because to do so (i.e., to say which city 
Rudy is in) would, under the circumstances of his not knowing which, 
infringe the second maxim of Quality. So the speaker of (2), by violat-
ing one maxim, invokes another, and implies thereby that he lacks "ade-
quate evidence" to say which city Rudy is in. (A few words about termi-
nology: Grice indifferently uses the term "violate" to characterize, in 
particular, the activity described in B above, and also, in general, any 
failure to fulfill a maxim [Grice 1975a: 49-52]; I use it in the latter 
sense throughout. And the notion of "invoking" the CP or a maxim is 
implicit in Grice, but the term is not his.) 
These last two kinds of maxim-violation, which convey an unstated but 
meant meaning, are two kinds of what Grice calls "conversational implica-
ture. 11 By judiciously relying on the CP and maxims in such ways, speakers 
often succeed in communicating, by "implicating," more than what they say. 
As in D, some implicatures flout a maxim so as to invoke the CP as a 
ground of interpretation. It is also possible to flout a maxim on the 
literal level (what is said) so as to invoke the same maxim at a fig-
urative level (what is implicated). Grice (1975a: 49, 52) joins these 
two maneuvers in one general kind: each "exploits" a maxim. Irony and 
metaphor are two standard forms of maxim-exploiting implicature. 
As in E, some implicatures flout a maxim so as to invoke another maxim 
as a ground of interpretation. There is a third general kind of implic-
ature, which involves no maxim-violation at all, but simply invokes a 
maxim as a ground of interpretation. °E'lus if you say "I am out of gas," 
and I say "There is a gas station around the corner," my saying so im-
plicates, by invoking the maxim of Relation, that I think it possible 
(at least) that the station is open and has gas to sell. 
Besides these three kinds of "conversational implicature, 11 Grice 
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identifies a category of "conventional implicature, 11 independent of the 
CP and its associated maxims; see Grice (1975a: 45), Kempson (1975: 145), 
and Katz (1972: 445-46) for discussions of this notion. He also dis-
tinguishes conversational implicatures that depend heavily on context or 
occasion ("particularized conversational implicatures") from those that 
do not ("generalized conversational implicatures"). The examples in D 
and E, respectively, happen to differ in this regard--though not because 
one turns on a clash, and the other on an exploitation. 
Grice (1975: 49-50) outlines the general line of reasoning by which the 
hearer should be able to recover the "implicatum" (thing implicated) in 
any given case of conversational implicature. Evidently the conversa-
tional implicatum will be determinate (determined by the intentions of 
the speaker) in every case. But Grice acknmvledges in passing (p. 58) 
that in some cases the hearer may be unable to rule out one or more 
possible interpretations; in that sense a particular implicaturn may be 
indeterminate. 
Grice's theory of conversational implicature has been variously attacked, 
defended, and revised by others. Keenan (1974), citing anthropological 
data, claims that Grice's conversational maxims are parochial, not uni-
versal; P. Brown and Levinson (1978: 298-99) argue to the contrary. Gor-
don and G. Lakoff (1971) try to formalize Grice's theory so as to fit it 
within a generative-semantics grammar. R. Lakoff (1973, 1975, 1977) and 
P. Brown and Levinson (1978) would place it within a larger model of 
sociolinguistic "politeness." 
The implications of Grice's model for literary and rhetorical theory have 
only begun to be explored. At the most basic level, Griffin (1977) notes 
that many reading-impaired children and adults have trouble reading be-
cause they fail to recognize conversational implicatures on the printed 
page as readily as they·would if the words were spoken. That 
is, they can read the words, but not between the lines. No doubt the 
same thing can happen to more sophisticated readers of more sophisticated 
texts. Although Pratt (1977) does not specifically discuss failing to 
grasp a literary irnplicature, she does apply Grice's basic two-person 
model to the four-person structure of reported speech or fiction (author, 
reported or fictional speaker, reported or fictional hearer, reader), and 
explores the many ways in which the author of a literary text can impli-
cate meanings through what he has his characters say. Hancher (1977: 
1095-96) makes the further suggestion that much omniscient narration, by 
flouting the second maxim of Quality, implicates that the narrative is 
fictional. 
As regards rhetoric, Grice himself notes that exploitative implicatures 
involve "something of the nature of a figure of speech." His own analysis 
of metaphor (1975a: 53) could use elaboration. R. Brown (forthcoming) 
provides such a full-dress analysis of irony. 
Cooper (1977) proposes that the occurrence of conversational implicature 
is a variable feature of literary style, which can distinguish one 
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literary genre from another, and one literary work from another. 
also relates the playwright's device of dialogic plot-exposition 
Grice's second maxim of Quantity, which it usually violates. 
She 
to 
Finally, van Dijk (1976: 44-49) would define "literature" itself as 
discourse that systematically subverts Grice's Cooperative Principle 
and all its maxims. Plus ~ change . 
Bates, Elizabeth. 1976. 
Pragmatics. New York: 
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